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In this article, we examine the relationship between safety culture and national culture, and
the implications of this relationship for international safety culture assessments. Focussing
on Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance (UA) index, a survey study of 13,616 Air Traffic
Management employees in 21 European countries found a negative association between
safety culture and national norm data for UA. This is theorized to reflect the influence of
national tendencies for UA upon attitudes and practices for managing safety (e.g., anxiety
on risk; reliance on protocols; concerns over reporting incidents; openness to different
perspectives). The relationship betweenUAand safety culture is likely to have implications
for international safety culture assessments. Specifically, benchmarking exercises will
consistently indicate safety management within organizations in high UA countries to be
poorer than low UA countries due to the influence of national culture upon safety
practices, which may limit opportunities for identifying and sharing best practice. We
propose the use of safety culture against international group norms (SIGN) scores to
statistically adjust for the influence of UA upon safety culture data, and to support the
identification of safety practices effective and particular to low or high UA cultures.
Practitioner points
 National cultural tendencies for uncertainty avoidance (UA) are negatively associatedwith safety culture.
 This indicates that employee safety-related attitudes and practices may be influenced by national
culture, and thus factors outside the direct control of organizational management.
 International safety culture assessments should attempt to determine the influence of national culture
upon safety culture in order that benchmarking exercises compare aspects of safety management and
not national culture.
 Safety culture against international group norms (SIGN) scores provide a potential way to do this, and
can facilitate the identification of best practice within countries operating in a low or high UA cultural
cluster.
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Safety culture refers to thenorms, values, andpractices shared by groups in relation to risk
and safety (Cooper, 2000; Pidgeon, 1998). Within safety-critical industries (e.g., nuclear
energy, oil and gas, aviation), safety culture assessments with cross-sectional surveys are
used to identify trends that are promotive (e.g., shared beliefs on risk) and problematic
(e.g., lack of incident reporting) for safety management (Carroll, 1998; Ek, Akselsson,
Arvidsson, & Johansson, 2007; Fuller & Vassie, 2001; Lee & Harrison, 2000). Through
further investigation, opportunities for interorganizational learning are identified (e.g.,
sharing best practice) and used to improve safety culture (Lee & Harrison, 2000; Mearns,
Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; Sexton et al., 2006). The globalized nature of many high-risk
industries means that safety culture assessments are increasingly conducted at an
international level (Reader & O’Connor, 2014; Sorra & Dyer, 2010; Taylor, 2010). Yet
research indicates that safety culturewithin an organizationmay be influenced bynational
cultural tendencies to avoid the anxiety caused by risky and ambiguous situations (called
‘uncertainty avoidance’; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). This has implications for
how the results of international safety culture assessments are analysed and interpreted. In
the current study, we explore this relationship through reporting on an investigation of
safety culture in the international Air TrafficManagement (ATM) industry.We theorize the
relationship between national culture and safety culture, and investigate this through
exploring the associations between national tendencies for uncertainty avoidance (UA)
and safety culture.We then consider the implications of this relationship for international
safety culture assessments, and propose that the association between UA and safety
culture be taken into account when benchmarking safety culture data from organizations
based in countries with diverse national cultures.
Safety culture
Safety culture is generally understood to be a safety-related facet of organizational culture
(Guldenmund, 2000), and conceptualizations of safety culture within the organizational
psychology literature focus on how shared norms and values shape safety practices.
Surveys are often used to evaluate safety culture (Conchie, Donald,&Taylor, 2006;Huber,
1991; Reason, 1997), and these typically measure organizational employee responses to a
number of latent dimensions, for example the commitment of management to safety, the
support given by an organization (e.g., resources) to improve safety, incident reporting
practices, collaborative activities to improve safety, and communication on safety
(Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2015). Where responses to such dimensions are
shared and positive across an organization, safety culture can be conceptualized as
‘strong’, and to have a positive influence upon safety (e.g., people can raise safety
concerns; Guldenmund, 2007, 2009, 2010; Joyce & Slocum, 1984; Smith, Dugan,
Peterson, & Leung, 1998). Conversely, negative, opposite, or fragmented perceptions can
indicate a ‘weak’ safety culture, which renders individuals and organizations susceptible
to workplace injuries and safety incidents (e.g., risk-taking; Beus, Payne, Bergman, &
Arthur, 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2010; Nahrgang,
Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011; Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009). Through
providing insight on the safety practices of employees andmanagers, safety culture survey
data are used to evaluate the effectiveness of organizational safety management strategies
(e.g., on reporting safety incidents), and to identify strengths and areas for improvement.
In describing safety culture, it is necessary to reflect on its relationship with safety
climate. This is because the distinction between safety culture and climate is an ongoing
subject for debate, and is relevant to considering how national culture influences
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organizational safety (Guldenmund, 2000; O’Connor, O’Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011).
Broadly, safety climate refers to the ‘surface features of the safety culture (. . .) at a given
point in time’ (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000, p. 178), and focuses on employee
beliefs in relation to management commitment to safety (DeJoy, 2005; Guldenmund,
2000, 2007; Zohar, 2010). Safety climate is generally considered to be narrower andmore
precisely defined than safety culture, and focuses on the prioritization of safety over other
possible targets (Zohar, 2010). Safety culture encapsulates a wider set of constructs (e.g.,
collaborating on safety, knowledge on safety, incident reporting practices, communica-
tion on risk) and can utilize a variety of measurement techniques, including surveys,
observations, focus groups, and incident analyses (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Guldenmund,
2010; Mearns & Flin, 1999; O’Connor et al., 2011). This has led to safety culture being
critiqued as a ‘fuzzy’ concept (Clarke, 2000), and the difference between safety culture
and safety climate has been likened to the difference between ‘personality’ and ‘mood’
(Cox & Flin, 1998). Critically, safety culture is conceptualized as being reflective of
enduring organizational, professional, and societal practices (Guldenmund, 2000;
Helmreich & Merritt, 1998), and this means it may be influenced by national culture.
This distinguishes it from safety climate, which captures more changeable beliefs about
the current organizational prioritization of safety.
Yet, to date, the relationship between national culture and safety culture has received
relatively little attention in the occupational psychology literature. In particular, there is a
need to better theorize how national culture might influence safety culture, and to
consider implications of this for safety culture assessments. For example, if employee
safety-related beliefs and practices are influenced by national culture, this indicates that
safety culture data may reflect both aspects of safety management and the societal
tendencies of the country where employees are based (which are external to an
organization). This raises questions over how safety culture data from different countries
can be compared to identify problems in safety management and opportunities for
learning. To explore this, we develop a theoretical framework for how national culture
might influence safety culture.
The relationship between national culture and safety culture
The need to examine the relationship between national culture and safety culture has
been recognized for some time within the occupational safety literature (Clarke, 1999).
Specifically, the ‘general’ organizational culture literature is instructive (Kirkman, Lowe,
& Gibson, 2006), and shows organizational culture to be influenced top-down by a range
of societal factors, for example national culture, language, training, progression systems,
access to economic resources, and political environment (Boroditsky & Schmidt, 2000;
Chunlin, Chengyu,&Boben, 1999; Erez&Gati, 2004;House, Hanges, Javidan,&Dorfman,
2004; Johnstone & Kanitsaki, 2006; Linell, 2009).
In particular, researchers have examined the relationship between organizational
culture and the five dimensions of national culture outlined by Hofstede (2001): Power
distance, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance (UA), masculinity, and long-term orienta-
tion.Within this model, a country’s citizens are conceptualized as developing a shared set
of core values and practices (e.g., through education, political and economic systems,
religion, media) that influence and normalize how people behave and think. These are
theorized to transfer into organizational life (e.g., through behavioural habits, norms on
contradicting those in authority, rewarding individual or collective performance), and to
implicitly shape organizational culture and behaviour. Research using Hofstede’s model
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provides supports for this conceptualization (although it is critiqued; McSweeney, 2002;
Tsui, Nifadkar, & Ou, 2007). For example, the survey responses of individuals to
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are shown as more similar within country than between
countries (Hofstede, 2002; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012a,b), organizational culture and
behaviour in multinational organizations are shown to vary according to the national
cultural norms of the countries where operations are based (Kirkman et al., 2006;
Schwartz, 1999), and where management practices are congruent with national culture,
organizational units are found to perform more effectively (Newman & Nollen, 1996).
Thus, in considering the relationship between national culture and safety culture, a
similar model to that outlined by Hofstede (2001) might be adopted. National cultural
tendencies that develop within a society, and implicitly shape employee beliefs andwork
behaviours, might also be expected to influence safety-related norms, values, and
practices. For example, national norms on power distance may determine how junior
colleagues communicate with managers on safety (e.g., challenging risk management
strategies), and tendencies for UA may influence willingness to engage in situations with
uncertain social consequences (e.g., admitting an error, organizational change). As
indicated in the organizational culture literature (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010;
House et al., 2004), this relationship is likely to depend on the pattern of national cultural
tendencies within a given country, their strength, and their concordance with the
espoused values and practices of an organization.
Although not extensive, safety research supports the notion that national culture may
influence safety culture. For example, differences in national cultural tendencies (e.g., UA,
long-term orientation) have been associated with variations in safety outcomes and
employee behaviour within global industries and multinational companies in domains
such as construction, shipping, and energy (Lu, Lai, Lun, & Cheng, 2012; Mearns & Yule,
2009; Spangenberg et al., 2003). Most promisingly, a growing body of research has
examined associations between safety culture and Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions of
national culture. While this work observes associations between safety culture and
different dimensions of national culture (e.g., power distance), a consistent relationship
has emerged between safety culture andUA. To reiterate, UA refers to the extent towhich
people in a society try to minimize anxiety caused by risky and ambiguous situations
(Hofstede et al., 2010). For example, research in Pakistan has shown associations
between self-reported UA and awareness of safety issues (Mohamed, Ali, & Tam, 2009),
and studies with Norwegian seafarers have found correlations between self-reported UA
and attitudes about safety improvements and conditions at work (Havold, 2010).
Furthermore, a high UA culture has been indicated to reduce the effectiveness of safety
training (14 countries, in multiple industries) due to it increasing the focus of employees
on structured scenarios and less on alternative scenarios (Burke, Chan-Serafin, Salvador,
Smith, & Sarpy, 2008), and in the aviation industry, national norms on high UA have been
negatively associated with perceptions of safety culture (Reader et al., 2015).
The nature and directionality of the above relationship has not been fully explained.
However, itmight broadly be reasoned that citizenswithin a givencountry develop shared
norms on UA, and that these influence the safety-related practices of employees, and thus
perceptions of safety culture. For example, shared tendencies for high UA might be
expected to lead to (1) less innovation and greater reliance on static procedures and
protocols for managing ambiguous and dynamic safety scenarios (Helmreich, 1999), (2)
reduced willingness to engage in social acts that have ambiguous and possibly socially
threatening consequences (e.g., admitting error, speaking-up) (Soeters & Boer, 2000), (3)
less flexibility to act on new and emerging risks, for example in terms of changing
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strategies and re-allocating resources (Waarts & Van Everdingen, 2005), (4) a feeling of
chronic unease due to concern over aspects of risk management that are beyond the
control of a given actor’s ability – for example where one must rely on another person to
manage safety (Fruhen, Flin, & McLeod, 2013), and (5) reduced tolerance of diverse
opinions on how to manage safety (Hofstede, 1983).
Thus, through applying Hofstede’s (2001) model, a conceptualization of how safety
culture is influenced by national culture can be developed. Yet, the specific interactions
between the different dimensions of safety culture and national cultural tendencies such
as UA remain unaccounted for. Furthermore, the implications of this relationship for
international safety culture assessments are unspecified. Chiefly, a question arises over
whether, if trends in safety culture data reflect national cultural tendencies that are
external to an organization, it is necessary to take into account this relationship when
comparing safety culture data fromunits or organizations operating in different countries?
The current study
In the section above, we considered how national culture might influence safety culture,
and identified a growing literature on its relationship with UA. We explore this further
through reporting on a study conductedwithin the European ATM industry, and describe
the two key foci of the study below.
The relationship between UA and safety culture
The first aim of the study is to examine the relationship between national cultural
tendencies for UA and safety culture. We do this through an international study of safety
culture in the high-risk industry of European ATM. ATM relates to the expeditious flow of
aircraft in flight or operating in themanoeuvring area of an airport’ (Ek &Arvidsson, 2012,
p. 82), and mishaps have potentially catastrophic consequences (e.g., the 2002
€Uberlingen mid-air collision in 2002). Most countries in Europe have one prominent
national Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), and these are typically staffed by
domestic staff (e.g., controllers, engineers), with safety practices being shaped by
European (i.e., EASA, EUROCONTROL) and country-specific (i.e., Civil Aviation Author-
ities) regulations, and organizational and national characteristics (e.g., traffic complexity,
resources, team structure, local norms; Eißfeldt, Heil, & Broach, 2002). With Europe
progressing towards a universal ATM system (a ‘single sky’), ensuring a strong andpositive
safety culture across all nations within an ATM system is essential for ANSPs to work
together to safely coordinate flight traffic (Ek & Arvidsson, 2012; Lofquist, 2010). Safety
culture assessments are utilized as a way to assess the safety management of ANSPs in
different countries, and are used to identify concerns and opportunities for improving
safety management.
To investigate the relationship between UA and safety culture, we examine for
associations between ANSP (i.e., country level) safety culture data collected in 21
countries and independent national norm data onUA. Tomeasure safety culture, we use a
six-dimension safety culture survey that has been tailored for use in ATM and shown as
having good psychometric properties when utilized in ANSPs within four culturally
distinct regions of Europe (North, East, South, West; please see Table 1).
Prior to examining associations between ANSP safety culture data and UA, it is first
necessary to ensure that the safety culture survey used to collect data from ATM staff
functions equivalently in the different countries included within the study. This is
National culture and safety culture 5
important for establishing that data from different ANSPs are comparable, with previous
research showing that safety culture survey tools do not necessarily function equivalently
in diverse cultural environments. For example, safety culture models established in
Western settings functionpoorlywhen tested indifferent cultural environments (Bahari &
Clarke, 2013), and participants from diverse cultural backgrounds respond differently to
latent questionnaire dimensions (Cigularov, Lancaster, Chen, Gittleman, & Haile, 2013).
Cross-national psychometric equivalence can be established through multigroup confir-
matory factor analysis (MGCFA) whereby the psychometric model underlying a safety
culture questionnaire is shown to function reliably and consistently in all of the countries
sampled (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Horn & McArdle, 1992). Thus, we first test the
psychometric equivalence of the six-dimension ATM safety culture model for each of the
21 national ANSPs included in this study (Hypothesis 1).
Having tested the functional equivalence of the safety culture model, we examine
whether the responses to the safety culture survey in the 21 ANSPs are associated with
independent national cultural norm data on UA for the countries in which the ANSPs are
based (Hofstede et al., 2010; House et al., 2004). Specifically, we predict that lowUAwill
be associated with more positive safety culture scores, and outline below the expected
relationship for each safety culture dimension.
Management commitment to safety. This dimension refers to the extent to which
ANSP employees consider management to prioritize safety. As indicated by national
culture research, low UA cultures tend to be less focussed on using procedures to control
Table 1. Dimensions for Air Traffic Management (ATM) safety culture survey
Dimension Definition
Management commitment to
safety (three items; a = .86)
Measures the extent to which management are committed to
safety, and is indicative of organizational prioritization of safety
within an ANSP
Collaborating for safety
(four items; a = .58)
Measures group attitudes and activities for safety management,
and is indicative of normative attitudes and behaviours amongst
ANSP staff towards safety
Incident reporting
(three items; a = .81)
Measures the extent to which respondents believe it is safe to
report safety incidents, which is essential for identifying system
weaknesses and opportunities for learning in ANSPs
Communication
(four items; a = .82)
Measures the extent to which staff are informed about
safety-related issues in the ATM system, and is important for
ensuring ANSP staff are aware of system changes that might
shape safety-related activities
Colleague commitment to safety
(three items; a = .71)
Beliefs about the reliability of colleagues safety-related behaviour,
and is indicative of the reliability of ANSP staff for engaging in
safety- activities
Safety support
(two items; a = .56)
Availability of resources and information for safety management,
and is indicative of active support within an ANSP for
maintaining safety
Note. ANSP, Air Navigation Service Provider.
The ATM safety culture survey was developed through an iterative series of interviews, observations,
incident reports, and systematic literature, and the items have been previously published (Reader et al.,
2015).
6 Mark C. Noort et al.
risk and more tolerant of diverse opinions (Hofstede, 1983). It might therefore
be expected that in such cultures, ANSP managers will be more willing to seek
out and encourage novel safety problems and solutions, and will be open to
opinions and suggestions different to their own. Because these are indicative of
management prioritization of safety, we hypothesize that management commitment
to safety will be more positive in ANSPs in low uncertainty avoidant countries
(Hypothesis 2a).
Collaborating for safety. This dimension refers to group attitudes and activities for
safety management, and refers to collaboration within and between ANSP teams (e.g.,
controllers collaborating on safety with engineering staff). In low UA cultures, people
tend to be more comfortable with opinions that contradict the group and potentially
cause embarrassment, and are less likely to be constrained by protocols and procedure
(Helmreich, 1999; Merkin, 2006). Such tendencies are arguably important for groups to
raise problems about safety performance (e.g., highlighting errors), and for innovating on
safety across the ANSP (e.g., developing new ways of working between safety and
engineering). Thus, we hypothesize that collaborating for safetywill be more positive in
ANSPs in low uncertainty avoidant countries (Hypothesis 2b).
Incident reporting. This refers to the extent to which respondents feel psychologically
safe to report safety incidents. National culture research shows that activities that deviate
from the norm andpotentially indicate poor performance tend to cause less anxiety in low
UA cultures, with there generally being reduced concern over the consequences of
reporting mistakes (Schultz, Johnson, Morris, & Dyrnes, 1993). Because such tendencies
are critical to reporting incidents in ATM, we hypothesize that incident reportingwill be
more positive in ANSPs in low uncertainty avoidant countries (Hypothesis 2c).
Communication. This refers to the extent to which stakeholders are informed and
engaged in system-related changes in the ATM system. As indicated by national culture
research, low UA cultures tend to be more comfortable with uncertainty and change, and
organizational communication is less constrainedbyprotocol or boundaries (Shane, 1995;
VanMuijen&Koopman, 1994). Itmight therefore be expected that in such cultures, ANSP
employees will be less concerned about change, with communication generally being
two-way and more open (e.g., through consultations, opportunities to raise problems).
Thus, we hypothesize communicationwill be more positive in ANSPs in low uncertainty
avoidant countries (Hypothesis 2d).
Colleague commitment to safety. This refers to beliefs about the reliability of
colleagues’ safety-related behaviour. In low UA cultures, people tend to be more tolerant
of behaviours and opinions different to their own, and less concerned about the activities
of others and risks that they cannot control (Barr & Glynn, 2004; Hofstede, 1983).
Concordantwith such tendencies, itmight be expected that ANSP staff in lowUAcultures
are less concerned about the reliability of their colleagues’ safety-related behaviour. Thus,
we hypothesize that colleague commitment to safety will be more positive in ANSPs in
low uncertainty avoidant countries (Hypothesis 2e).
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Safety support. This refers to the availability of resources and information for safety
management. National culture research shows that low UA cultures tend to be less
constrained by rules and protocols (Koopman et al., 1999; Shane, 1995), and in such
cultures, it might be expected that there is greater flexibility for ANSPs to provide
resources and information for safety (e.g., greater autonomy for ANSP managers in how
resources are allocated). Thus,wehypothesize that safety supportwill bemore positive in
ANSPs in low uncertainty avoidant countries (Hypothesis 2f).
Implications of a relationship between UA and safety culture for international safety culture
assessments
The second aim of this study is to consider the challenges posed by a relationship between
UA and safety culture for international safety culture assessments, and to examine
whether as a solution to these, national variations inUAmight be taken into accountwhen
comparing safety culture data from different countries. To recap, safety culture
assessments are used to detect potential problems and best practice in safety manage-
ment. They do this through identifying weak and strong performing units and
organizations, and recognizing opportunities for interorganizational learning where
practice can be shared to improve safety (Mearns et al., 2001). This is often performed
through ‘benchmarking’ units and organizations against one another to normalize and
compare data (Bhutta&Huq, 1999;Moriarty& Smallman, 2009;Watson, 1993), and safety
culture benchmarking is commonplace within many safety-critical industries (Evans,
Glendon, & Creed, 2007; Lee & Harrison, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Nieva &
Sorra, 2003). Yet, if a relationship between UA and safety culture is established, two key
challenges emerge in terms of benchmarking safety culture data from units and
organizations in different countries.
The first challenge is that a negative association between safety culture and UA is
likely to skew the results of international benchmarking exercises. Specifically,
operations in low UA countries will consistently report a stronger safety culture than
those in high UA countries. This is problematic, as benchmarking will in part reflect the
influence of national cultural tendencies (that are outside the control of an
organization) upon safety beliefs and practices. This has implications for the operations
that are identified as having the ‘weakest’ and ‘strongest’ safety culture (and by
implication safety management system), and the actions that arise from this (e.g., for
allocating resources, changing procedures, instituting training). It is also likely to ‘reify’
safety culture, with organizations in high UA countries being constantly ranked lowest,
and improvements in their safety practices not being reflected in re-surveys due to
them appearing minor in the context of the wider data set (which is influenced by
wider and stable societal structures).
The second challenge is that a negative association between safety culture and UA
is likely to limit the identification of opportunities for sharing best practice (Mearns
et al., 2001). For example, organizations in low UA cultures that are constantly
identified as strong performers may appear to have little to learn from organizations in
high UA cultures. Furthermore, practices that are identified as ‘best’ in one cultural
setting may not transfer well to another. For instance, research in multinational
companies shows that the effectiveness of safety policies depends in part on their
appropriateness to the wider national cultural environment in which they are enacted
(Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 1995). Similarly, the extent to which safety practices
developed by organizations in low UA countries (e.g., for incident reporting) will be
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effective in high UA cultures may depend on the appropriateness of these practices to
wider cultural norms.
We propose that a potential solution to these challenges is to develop ‘clusters’ of
countries with comparable norms on UA in order that safety culture can be assessed
against the context of national cultural tendencies. Evaluating safety culture in UA
clusters norm-groups (e.g., low and high) would provide the following benefits. It
would avoid benchmarking exercises resulting in skewed findings whereby they
present an overly optimistic assessment of safety management (because safety culture
is in part a function of national cultural tendencies outside the control of management)
at organizations in low UA countries when they are compared against high UA
countries (and vice versa). Furthermore, ensuring countries are compared against
culturally similar countries will allow for relative comparisons of poor and good
practices in safety management that would be otherwise undetected (because they
would not stand out in the wider data set). This would facilitate the identification and
sharing of best practices specific to a particular cultural context. Through comparing
safety culture within UA-related clusters, insight can be provided on practices
favourable and challenging to safe operations within a high or low UA setting (Janssens
et al., 1995; Michael & College, 1997; Robert, Probst, Martocchio, Drasgow, & Lawler,
2000). For example, safety-related practices that are identified within best-performing
organizations in a high UA setting (e.g., policies for ensuring anonymity in incident
reporting) can be better understood in terms of why they are effective (e.g., they
address anxiety caused by high UA), and shared amongst countries with similar belief
structures. Such practices may be less relevant to low UA settings (e.g., where staff are
less concerned about anonymity in reporting), with their utility being masked within a
larger benchmarking exercise (where safety practices are not considered in terms of
societal context, and all ANSPs are compared).
We examine this in ATM, and identify clusters of ANSPs with comparable tendencies
for UA. Consistent with the national variations on tendencies for UA described by
Hofstede (2001), we expect that clusters of comparable ANSPs (in terms of safety culture)
can be identified according to the national norm data for UA for the countries in which
ANSPs are located. Having identified clusters of countries that group together, we will
then ‘scale’ safety culture assessment scores in a way that captures and reflects national
variations inUA. To do this,we develop safety culture against international groupnorm
(SIGN) scores, which are safety culture scores transformed into z-scores (Mearns, Flin,
Gordon, O’Connor, & Whitaker, 2000; Mearns et al., 2001), and present the relative
position of an organization within a cultural cluster. SIGN scores highlight variations
against a group norm (e.g., half-standard deviations) on a normal distribution, and signal a
relative position of safety culture strength rather than a direct comparison of raw scores.
This is an approach applied in many fields and emerges from the cognitive intelligence
literature (i.e., IQ scores) where cross-national variations and longitudinal improvements
can confound intelligence scores (Cattell, 1934, 1943; Cicchetti, 1994; Flynn, 1987, 1999;
Naglieri, 2003). Through applying SIGN scores to analyse safety culture data in clusters of
countries, the context ofmeasurement can be integrated into the interpretation of scores.
This means safety culture data are re-scaled to fit a given cultural context, with the
assessment of safety culture being directed towards learning between organizations and
regions. In the current study,we apply the SIGN scores to examine the relative strength of
safety culture amongst ANSPs units in countries with different national cultural
tendencies.
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Method
Participants
A total of 13,616 ANSP employees based in 21 European countries returned a safety
culture survey between 2011 and 2014. This was part of a wider ongoing investigation of
safety culture in European ATM, with over 30 countries being investigated to date. To
ensure anonymity at an ANSP level, general demographic data (i.e., age, gender) were not
collected. Participantswere classified as having one of four general roles:Operational staff
(n = 6,500), management (n = 1,592), engineering (n = 1,764), or administration
(n = 3,717). A small number of participants (n = 43) reported no primary role but were
still taken up in the analyses. Demographic statistics of the survey sample are summarized
in Table 2.
Air Navigation Service Providers varied in size (M = 650; SD = 680). Due to political
sensitivities of European ATM, and to ensure continued support of ANSPs in future
research, we are unable to report specific countries involved. Doing this would
compromise the anonymity of the ANSPs.
Procedure and measures
Safety culture surveyswere distributed electronically and/or through paper-and-pen at 21
ANSPs. This depended on local preference, and therewere no differences found between
the data collected through the different methods. Surveys were part of a mixed-methods
investigationof safety culture,whereby theywere distributed to staff, and then, the results
were discussed with staff in workshops and interviews (depending on the size of
Table 2. Demographics showing staff groups across 21 Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs)
ANSP Operational staff Managers Engineers Admin Total (role missing)
1 1,258 128 270 419 2,075
2 311 29 45 131 516
3 47 11 27 44 129
4 105 13 18 41 177
5 536 416 78 583 1,613
6 319 41 35 315 710
7 172 58 146 127 503
8 83 22 31 62 198
9 128 9 24 30 191 (3)
10 71 35 71 15 195 (3)
11 71 10 11 2 99 (5)
12 361 36 83 36 551 (35)
13 904 244 290 678 2,116
14 252 46 74 100 472
15 86 30 31 30 177
16 48 9 16 50 123
17 91 21 63 151 326
18 226 39 51 76 392
19 379 42 0 113 534
20 231 72 55 107 465
21 821 281 345 607 2,054
Total 6,500 1,592 1,764 3,717 13,616 (43)
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organization there was 24–60 hr of focus group activity). Focus groups resulted in a set of
safety recommendations being developed for each ANSP, in coordinationwith their safety
management team. The method for this has been previously described (Mearns et al.,
2013).
The survey tool used to collect safety culture data was iteratively developed through a
series of safety culture investigations prior to 2010 (Mearns et al., 2013). These included
staff interviews and workshops, discussions with safety managers, pilot testing, and
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. The survey reflects a range of safety culture
issues specific to ATM, and the six underlying dimensions iterate well-established themes
within the safety culture literature (Guldenmund, 2007).Wehavepresented the items and
characteristics of the dimensions elsewhere (Reader et al., 2015). Questionnaires were
translated and back translated (or partially translated, depending on the usage of English
within the ANSPs) into the national language(s) of the ANSPs.
Analysis
The relationship between UA and safety culture
The psychometric equivalence of the ATM safety culture survey toolwas examined across
21 ANSPs using AMOS 19 (Hypothesis 1). This was tested for occupational groups
(operational staff, management, engineers, administration) and ANSPs. Missing data were
replaced across these groups using EM estimation (Enders, 2003), and steps forMGCFA in
the measurement equivalence literature were followed (Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005;
Ployhart & Oswald, 2004; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). After testing whether the model
fits independently in each group, equivalence was established by testing the cross-
national equivalence of the model across all ANSPs. While this is sometimes regarded as
sufficient for establishing model equivalence across groups (Chen et al., 2005), further
steps tested first- and second-order factor loadings, latent means and correlations and,
finally, residual and measurement errors. Goodness of fit for the model was indicated by
the RMSEA (<.08 amoderate fit; <.06 a good fit) andCFI. To adjust for underestimatedCFIs
when RMSEAs for the independence model are small (i.e., <.158; Kenny, 2014), and
reduce the chance of a type 1 error (i.e., false rejection), CFIswere interpreted at ≥.90 (for
a good fit), and ≥.85 (for a moderate fit). Model comparison was based on DCFI > .1.
To establish whether low UA was associated with more positive safety culture scores
on the six dimensions of the safety culture survey tool (Hypothesis 2a–f), disaggregated
country-level data on national cultural values (Hofstede, 2001) was associated with
individual-level safety culture scores using Pearson correlations.
Taking into account national variations in UA when benchmarking safety culture data
To establish national cultural clusters, a two-step cluster analysis (with SPSS version 21;
IBM Corp, 2012) was conducted at the ANSP level. Two-step cluster methods examine
whether units cluster together so that countries in groupA aremore similar to countries in
group A on UA than to countries in group B, etcetera (Zhang, Ramakrishnon, & Livny,
1996). Independent and readily available data at the country level from Hofstede’s UA
Index (Hofstede, 2001) was used to cluster the 21 countries in this study. Clusters were
evaluated based on their average silhouettewidth (ASW; i.e., extent of distinctiveness and
overlap between clusters), which is calculated as SWi = (biai)/max(ai, bi). An ASW of
≥.6 are indicative of reasonable clusters (Kaufman & Warner, 1990; Wiechmann, 2008).
An ANOVA tested for variation in UA between clusters.
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To construct a scale for analysing safety culture data in the context of national cultural
norms, SIGN scores were generated by calculating z-scores for each safety culture
dimension within each cultural cluster, with z = (xl)/r. Weights were applied
proportionally to account for ANSP size differences within their cluster, with pk = % of
ANSP in the population/% of ANSP in sample. To ease interpretation, calculated z-scores
were set to 100 and standard deviations to 15 to form SIGN scores. Qualitative data from
survey free text comments and follow-upworkshopswith ANSP staff were used to further
illustrate the utility of taking into account variations in UA when interpreting safety
culture data.
Results
The relationship between UA and safety culture
The MGCFA indicated that the safety culture assessment tool holds moderately to good
across all 21 ANSPs (Hypothesis 1 supported). A small RMSEA was found for the
independence model (RMSEA = .048 [.048–.049]), indicating underestimation of CFIs.
CFIs suggested the model fitted the data well for 12 ANSPs (CFIs ≥ .90), and moderately
for nine ANSPs (CFIs ≥ .85). Combinedwith RSMEAs, the results suggested four ANSPs to
have weakest fit (moderate CFIs with RMSEAs > .08, for ANSPs 1, 13, 14 and 21). Next to
underestimated CFIs, this weaker fit was likely explained by constraints put on themodel
to sufficiently identify themodel (i.e., second-order constraints and correlationswereheld
constant across ANSPs). Still, even considering these constraints, further analysis
indicated that the model held across ANSPs (CFI = .90; RMSEA = .02 [.02–.02]) and that
first- and second-order factor loadings are equivalent across groups (DCFI < .1). However,
constraining item means decreased model fit (DCFI = .2), indicating that individual
items had different scores across ANSPs. Constraining factor variances and residual errors
did not significantly reducemodel fit, but constrainingmeasurement variances did.While
CFIs dropped below .85 from step 4 onwards, this established psychometric equivalence
of the safety culture assessment tool across Europe. In particular, it is indicated that the
model and first- and second-order factor loadings are equivalent across groups, justifying
mean comparisons of safety culture. Model fit indices are summarized in Table 3.
Correlational analyses indicated that UA was associated negatively with safety culture
dimensions, and regression analyses indicated that UA was a significant predictor for
safety culture (r > |.13|, ps < .001). Specifically, this was the case for management
commitment to safety, b = .16; F(1, 13614) = 363.77; p < .001: Hypothesis 2a
supported, collaborating for safety, b = .23; F(1, 13614) = 750.41; p < .001: Hypoth-
esis 2b supported, incident reporting, b = .23; F(1, 13614) = 732.51; p < .001:
Hypothesis 2c supported, communication, b = .18; F(1, 13614) = 472.65; p < .001:
Hypothesis 2d supported, colleague commitment to safety, b = .13; F
(1, 13614) = 230.15; p < .001: Hypothesis 2e supported, and safety support,
b = .17; F(1, 13614) = 409.62; p < .001: Hypothesis 2f supported. Pearson correla-
tions are summarized in Table 4.
Taking into account national variations in UA when benchmarking safety culture data
A cluster analysis revealed two cultural clusters for UA across Europe. A two-step cluster
analysis indicated two distinctive clusters, one with high UA (12 ANSPs; n = 6,957;
M = 87.22; SD = 6.17) and another with low UA (nine ANSPs; n = 6,959; M = 47.62;
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SD = 15.40). This solutionwith two clusters resembled a reasonable structure, ASW = .6,
and an ANOVA indicated that the difference in UA between the clusters was large,
F(1, 13614) = 39407.22, p < .001, g2 = .74. Furthermore, the low and high UA clusters
varied significantly on all safety culture dimensions, F(1, 13614) > 163.28, p < .001,
g2 = .012–.075. Descriptive statistics for the UA clusters are summarized in Table 5.
Table 3. Model fit indices of within and across 21 Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs)
Analysis ANSP v2 df v2/df CFI ΔCFI Compare RMSEA
90% CI
RMSEA
0 1 392.45 143 2.74 .86 .100 .088 .111
2 1764.74 143 12.34 .93 .074 .071 .077
3 305.89 143 2.14 .90 .076 .064 .088
4 432.88 143 3.03 .92 .063 .056 .070
5 540.88 143 3.78 .90 .077 .070 .084
6 298.96 143 2.09 .91 .076 .064 .088
7 253.80 143 1.78 .88 .066 .053 .080
8 242.72 143 1.70 .90 .074 .058 .090
9 405.87 143 2.84 .93 .063 .056 .070
10 295.31 143 2.07 .85 .093 .078 .109
11 480.02 143 3.36 .93 .065 .059 .072
12 447.16 143 3.13 .88 .081 .072 .089
13 2033.51 143 14.22 .86 .091 .087 .094
14 1035.67 143 7.24 .85 .094 .089 .099
15 491.48 143 3.44 .92 .070 .063 .076
16 428.03 143 2.99 .90 .071 .064 .079
17 1816.82 143 12.71 .89 .074 .071 .077
18 477.31 143 3.34 .92 .066 .060 .073
19 284.30 143 1.99 .87 .071 .059 .083
20 1569.51 143 10.98 .91 .070 .067 .073
21 253.87 143 1.78 .89 .089 .071 .107
1 All 13253.19 3,003 4.41 .90 .017 .017 .017
2 15164.19 3,263 4.65 .88 .0 2 vs. 1 .017 .017 .018
3 16092.50 3,323 4.84 .87 .0 3 vs. 2 .018 .018 .018
4* 33718.10 3,703 9.11 .70 .2 4 vs. 3 .026 .026 .026
5* 33718.10 3,703 9.11 .70 .0 5 vs. 4 .026 .026 .026
6* 33718.10 3,703 9.11 .70 .0 6 vs. 5 .026 .026 .026
7 36390.55 3,823 9.52 .68 .0 7 vs. 6 .027 .026 .027
8 37695.41 3,943 9.56 .67 .0 8 vs. 7 .027 .026 .027
9 55790.76 4,323 12.91 .49 .2 9 vs. 8 .031 .031 .032
*Similar model constraints.
Table 4. Pearson correlations between uncertainty avoidance (UA) and safety culture scores
Management
commitment
to safety
Collaboration
for safety
Incident
reporting Communication
Colleague
commitment
to safety
Safety
support
UA .16 .23 .23 .18 .13 .17
Note. Ps (two-tailed) < .001, n = 13,616.
National culture and safety culture 13
To scale for international safety culture data, SIGN scoreswere calculated relative to an
ANSP’s cultural cluster in order to incorporate the effect of national culture into the safety
culture scores (see Table 6). To illustrate this, we focus on the use of SIGN scores for the
Table 6. Safety culture and SIGN scores (with SD) in a high and low uncertainty avoidance (UA) cluster
for ‘collaboration for safety’ and ‘incident reporting’
Cluster ANSP
Collaboration for safety Incident reporting
Raw SIGN Raw SIGN
High UA 1 2.89 (0.80) 89 (16) 2.42 (1.00) 86 (15)
2 3.39 (0.78) 99 (16) 2.82 (1.00) 92 (15)
3 3.47 (0.67) 101 (14) 3.36 (0.82) 101 (13)
4 3.16 (0.57) 94 (12) 2.71 (0.81) 91 (12)
5 3.63 (0.59) 104 (12) 3.28 (0.79) 99 (12)
6 3.65 (0.66) 104 (14) 3.44 (0.79) 102 (12)
7 3.52 (0.64) 102 (13) 3.57 (0.73) 104 (11)
8 3.71 (0.61) 106 (12) 3.99 (0.70) 110 (11)
9 3.09 (0.73) 93 (15) 3.00 (0.95) 95 (14)
10 3.83 (0.59) 108 (12) 4.25 (0.59) 114 (9)
11 3.31 (0.71) 97 (15) 3.41 (0.98) 101 (15)
12 3.64 (0.75) 104 (15) 3.64 (0.89) 105 (14)
Total 3.44 (0.73) 100 (15) 3.33 (0.98) 100 (15)
Low UA 13 3.11 (0.54) 89 (12) 3.26 (0.77) 95 (13)
14 3.75 (0.60) 103 (13) 3.78 (0.69) 104 (12)
15 3.57 (0.55) 99 (12) 3.65 (0.63) 101 (11)
16 3.15 (0.72) 90 (16) 2.54 (0.83) 83 (14)
17 3.30 (0.62) 93 (13) 3.01 (0.83) 91 (14)
18 3.65 (0.56) 101 (12) 3.60 (0.70) 101 (12)
19 4.09 (0.55) 111 (12) 4.25 (0.57) 112 (10)
20 4.11 (0.57) 111 (13) 4.19 (0.62) 111 (11)
21 3.76 (0.62) 103 (13) 3.81 (0.73) 104 (12)
Total 3.61 (0.69) 100 (15) 3.56 (0.88) 100 (15)
Note. ANSP = Air Navigation Service Provider.
High UA cluster = 12 ANSPs (n = 6,957); low UA cluster = 9 ANSPs (n = 6,959).
Table 5. Mean and standard deviations for the low and high uncertainty avoidance (UA) clusters
Safety culture dimension
High UA
cluster LowUA cluster Total
M SD M SD M SD
Management commitment to safety 3.78 0.99 3.97 0.82 3.88 0.91
Collaboration for safety 3.44 0.73 3.61 0.69 3.53 0.71
Incident reporting 3.33 0.98 3.56 0.88 3.45 0.94
Communication 3.39 0.92 3.56 0.78 3.47 0.85
Colleague commitment to safety 3.93 0.69 3.99 0.66 3.96 0.68
Safety support 3.46 0.95 3.65 0.87 3.55 0.92
Note. ANSP = Air Navigation Service Provider.
High UA cluster = 12 ANSPs (n = 6,957); low UA cluster = 9 ANSPs (n = 6,959).
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dimensions of incident reporting and collaborating for safety, as these were found to be
the safety culture dimensions with the strongest association with UA.
First, for benchmarking safety culture, the incident reporting data shows ANSPs to
score differently in terms of ‘raw’ safety culture scores, yet similarly in terms of the relative
performance within a cultural cluster. For example, ANSP 3 (M = 3.36; SD = 0.82) in the
high UA group scored lower on incident reporting than ANSP 15 (M = 3.65; SD = 0.63).
Yet when norm data on UA was taken into account, the ANSPs have similar SIGN scores
(101). Qualitative survey comments and follow-up workshops with ATM staff (e.g.,
controllers) illustratedwhy thismight be the case. Specifically, both ANSPswere small, and
had comparable safety systems for incident reporting (e.g., anonymous, with de-
individualized feedback being provided to learn from incidents). However, in the high
UA group, participants tended to bemore concerned on disrupting thework of colleagues,
anxious about the embarrassment of potentially being identified from the incident report,
and uncertain on how the external regulator would assess them. Arguably, these reflect
broader societal factors (i.e., anxiousness on how incidents will be perceived by
colleagues) rather than concerns about the incident reporting system itself (i.e., that those
who report incidents will be treated fairly). Thus, while the raw scores do represent
differences in beliefs about incident reporting, the ‘SIGN’ scores reflect the observation
that the incident reporting systems were actually similar in both ANSPs (i.e., one was not
‘weaker’ than the other), with differences in perceptions potentially being explained by
broader societal tendencies for UA rather than problems in incident management.
Second, in terms of facilitating the sharing of best practice, Table 6 indicates that
ANSPs can have similar raw scores, but perform differently in terms of relative position
within a cultural cluster. For example, ANSP5 (M = 3.63; SD = 0.95) in the highUAgroup
andANSP15 (M = 3.57; SD = 0.83) in the lowUAgrouphad similar scores in terms of raw
safety culture scores, but their corresponding SIGN scores varied (i.e., 104 and 99,
respectively). This indicated that in relation to their cultural cluster, ANSP 5 performed
well in the high UA group and ANSP 15 less so in the lowUA group. Survey comments and
follow-up workshops indicated that in the low UA group, technical and administrative
systems did not support collaboration on safety as well as they might do (e.g., developing
and instituting safety protocols with colleagues from different departments). However, in
the high UA group, participants were empowered and encouraged by management to
collaborate on safety (e.g., raising safety issues in teams). Thus, while the raw scores
indicated similar results for the dimension of collaborating for safety in ANSP 5 and ANSP
15, the SIGN scores indicated potential opportunities for sharing best practices within a
cultural cluster that would have remained otherwise unidentified, with practices
appearing relevant to the cultural context of the cluster within which the ANSP was
based (but not necessarily relevant to the other cluster).
Discussion
Through showing national norms for UA to be associated with safety culture in national
ATM organizations, we have found support for a theorization of how national cultural
tendencies influence safety culture. Furthermore, through developing safety culture
against international groupnorms (SIGN) scores to statistically control for the influence
of UA upon safety culture data, we have proposed a new technique for supporting the
identification of safety practices effective and particular to different national cultures. We
consider the implications of the study below.
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Theoretical implications
Researchers have previously considered the possibility for a relationship between UA and
safety culture (Burke et al., 2008; Havold, 2010; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Mohamed
et al., 2009).We investigated this through amulticountry study, and our findings indicate
a relationship between UA and safety culture. This supports the notion that safety culture
should be understood as a concept shaped by broader cultural phenomena such as
national culture. Across a sample of 13,616 employees based in 21 national ANSPs, we
found tendencies for UA to be negatively associated with positive responses to the six
survey dimensions of safety culture.
Although this relationship was only associative, it seems more likely that national
cultural norms for UA (which are generalized from a nation’s population) influence safety
culture in ANSPs (i.e., an organization within that nation) than the reverse. Utilizing
previous work investigating national culture and organizational culture (Hofstede et al.,
2010; Kirkman et al., 2006), we theorized that national cultural tendencies for UA that
develop within a society will implicitly influence employee safety practices. This appears
to occur through two intertwining mechanisms. First, national tendencies for UA shape
safety-related practices (e.g., the openness of management to opinions different to their
own) which in turn influence perceptions of safety culture (e.g., management
commitment to safety). Second, national tendencies for UA shape the attitudes of staff
towards safety-related practices (e.g., anxiety over the embarrassment ofmaking an error)
and these influence responses to the safety culture survey (e.g., on incident reporting).
Future research should attempt to further establish the directionality and mechanisms
through which UA influences safety culture (e.g., through qualitative or longitudinal
work).
At a broader level, the study findings indicate that alongside sociotechnical
perspectives from the engineering and cognitive sciences, safety culture research needs
to bemore informed by cultural psychology. In comparisonwith affiliated fields of inquiry
such as risk research (Lupton, 1999), safety culture research uses a limited range of
cultural theory and methods. Indeed, safety culture might be conceptualized to include
issues of power and national cultural norms (e.g., Antonsen, 2009; Choudhry, Fang, &
Mohamed, 2007; Edwards, Davey, & Armstrong, 2013; Haukelid, 2008), and may also
benefit from applying cultural theories of risk (Douglas, 1992), perspectives on risk
society (Beck & Van Loon, 2000; Giddens, 1999), systems theories (Mele, Pels, & Polese,
2010), and governmentality (Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991).
Yet, conceptualizing safety culture in this way also raises questions over how safety
culture can be changed. For example, if safety culture is in part reflective of societal
practices and habits for communicating and acting (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Berger &
Luckmann, 1966), to what extent do organizations have influence over the safety-related
practices and beliefs of employees (e.g., where safety practices are counterintuitive to
societal norms (Berry, 1997))? Schein (1992) argues that organizations can change
permanently via temporal acceptance of novel practice (or changes to practice), and this
indicates that organizations may be able to surpass cultural barriers to safety through
favouring and rewarding practices that underpin safety.
Practical implications
The relationship between UA and safety culture was argued to generate at least two
practical challenges for international safety culture assessments. First, it is likely to skew
the benchmarking of units or organizations based in different countries. Survey
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assessments of organizations with ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ safety cultures will tend to favour
operations in low UA countries. Yet, because safety culture scores partly reflect
tendencies for UA, this may provide a consistently optimistic or pessimistic impression of
organizations operating in low and high UA countries. Second, safety practices in some
countries may be specific to solving a problem in a particular cultural context, and
benchmarking exercises should attempt to identify and understand such practices in
order to facilitate learning. To examine this, we performed a cluster analysis using norm
data on UA for the countries involved in the study. This revealed high and low clusters of
countries for UA. We then calculated safety culture against international group norms
(SIGN) scores to allow for relative inspections and interpretations of safety culture data.
Comparisons of low UA and high UA ANSPs for incident reporting showed that ANSPs
could score quite differently in terms of raw scores, yet perform equally in their cultural
grouping (with attitudes towards incident reporting appearing to be influenced by UA
rather than differences in safety management). Conversely, ANSPs could have similar raw
scores for collaborating on safety, but quite divergent SIGN scores (indicating them to be
performing differentially within their cultural cluster). This allowed for the safety
performance of ANSPs to be understood within a cultural context (i.e., against peer
countries with similar cultures), and for best practices related to those contexts (e.g.,
empowerment in high UA settings) to be identified and potentially shared. Thus, SIGN
scores may provide a useful way to consider the influence of national culture upon safety
culturewhen benchmarking internationally. Crucially, ignoring the relationship between
UA and safety culture will mean benchmarking exercises do not take into account the
structural influence of national cultural tendencies external to safety management upon
safety practices. This is important, as one of the indicators of a good safety culture may be
the extent to which safety policies and practices are aligned to national cultural
environments (Janssens et al., 1995). Where management practices contradict national
cultural norms orpolitical environments (e.g., reducing job security in highUAcountries),
employees can respond negatively and be less understanding of organizational policy
(Debus, Probst, K€onig, &Kleinmann, 2012;Michael &College, 1997; Robert et al., 2000).
Yet, devising safety policies specific to particular countries necessitates diversity in safety
management, and this presents challenges for industries such as ATM, where standard-
ization and predictability of operations are essential.
Overall, the SIGN scoremethodology appears a promisingway to take into account the
relationship between national culture and safety culture when conducting international
safety culture assessments. However, further research is required and the technique is
preliminary. For example, the added value of SIGN scores in terms of predicting safety
outcomes is yet to be demonstrated, SIGN scores do not differ radically from raw safety
culture scores (although the relative performance of an ANSP against other ANSPs does
change), and a more systematic evaluation of the SIGN score methodology for facilitating
organizational learning on safety is required. Future work will investigate this.
Limitations
This study has some noteworthy limitations. It is important to remember that quantitative
measures only provide a proxy for safety culture. Safety culture is assessed from trends in
the survey data, yet this data does not specify exactly where a culture is strong or weak
(e.g., as indicated by safety performance data). Furthermore, while a subset of safety
culture (i.e., safety climate) has been associated with outcomes (Clarke, 2010),
questionnaire data on perceptions of beliefs and commitment ofmanagers and colleagues
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donot fully capture deeper layers of culture (Geertz, 1994). The extent towhich the safety
culture measure used in this study is distinct from safety climate is unclear. Other
approaches (e.g., observations) provide contextualized ‘thick descriptions’ and describe
tacit knowledge underlying practices, and should supplement survey data examining
culture. We encourage future research to address triangulation in international contexts,
and although we did collect qualitative data, in-depth analysis of this was beyond the
scope of the article.
Furthermore, while SIGN scores transform raw safety culture data to include national
culture, the conditions under which they may be appropriate to employ vary. For
example, in some cases differences between units in cultural clusters were small (e.g., for
colleague commitment to safety), indicating the relationship between safety culture and
national cultural dimensions to vary in strength.Other national cultural tendenciesmay be
relevant (e.g., power distance), and our study relied on norm data from the GLOBE study
to measure national culture, and this may not be reflective of the ATM sample. This
approach has been critiqued (Tsui et al., 2007), with theorists questioning the extent to
which societies develop universal tendencies that can be measured (McSweeney, 2002).
To understand how tendencies for UA influence safety culture, more behavioural and
human performance focussed analyses are required.
In terms of taking into account UA when benchmarking safety culture, a number of
other scenarios might also be considered. For example, where multiple units are based
within a country, it might be assumed that units have a similar national culture (and thus
the same score on Hofstede’s independent norm scores for UA), and national culture
would not be used to explain differences. Furthermore, where national norm data are not
available to researchers, or organizations are staffed by highly multicultural workforces
(for example expatriates), it may be useful to measure UA within the organizations being
studied.
Lastly, crucial to the notion of international safety culture benchmarking is the
assumption thatmeasurement equivalence canbe established.Where it is not established,
it may mean that survey data cannot be meaningfully compared across countries and that
benchmarking should remain internal. This speaks to the importance of developing
measurement tools that address the universal safety concerns of organizations and
industries operating internationally. Despite sufficient model fit indices being established
for our own safety culture model, results indicated that for some ANSPs further
refinementsmight benefit themodel. Thismight be explainedby lowerCronbach’s alphas
for collaborating for safety and safety support. In the light of ongoing refinements to the
model, this is expected to improve and we will address this in future research.
Conclusion
Through extending Hofstede’s conceptualization of how national cultural tendencies
develop and influence organizational culture to the domain of occupational safety, we
hypothesized a relationship between UA and safety culture. The analysis of data collected
within the European ATM industry supported this relationship, with significant
theoretical and practical implications for the conduct of safety culture research in
cross-cultural settings. Further research is required to establish the directionality and
mechanisms underlying the relationship between national culture and safety culture, and
to examine the benefits of taking this relationship into account when conducting
international safety culture research.
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